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EthicAl issuEs in 
rEsuscitAtion 
IntroductIon                                                              
“Resuscitation” derives from Latin roots meaning to reawaken or 
set in motion again. Resuscitation implies reanimation of a body 
seemingly bereft of life. Resuscitation, as the authors use the term, 
is an overt effort to thwart apparently imminent death.
Early resuscitation techniques targeted accident victims harmed 
by trauma or drowning and sought to restore air movement into 
the lungs through mechanical chest movement. Attempts dating 
back to the mid 18th century have been reported. As insight into 
the pathophysiology of cardiac arrest improved, the procedures 
to resuscitate or re-animate expanded to include mouth-to-mouth 
inflation of the lungs and cardiac compression, not only closed, 
but also even direct squeezing of the heart in an opened chest.(1)
Early resuscitation raised little ethical concern. Drowning victims 
were often youths without underlying pathology and attempts to 
prolong life were presumed to be desirable and appropriate. As 
resuscitation techniques improved its application expanded to 
potentially include anyone suffering cardiac arrest – raising the risk 
that patients might be resuscitated despite painful irreversible con-
ditions likely to cause imminent death regardless. Resuscitation’s 
Ethical issues in resuscitation arose once life-prolonging 
interventions advanced to the point where short-term 
cardiac resuscitation became plausible in patients in cases 
where imminent death was irreversible. the authors argue 
that ethical dilemmas arise from disputes over continued 
treatment when stakeholders either disagree about the 
meaning of appropriate care as a result of  differing beliefs 
on the meaning of an acceptable outcome and/or the extent 
of a treatment’s probable efficacy. the authors conclude 
that even though communication and transparency can 
help prevent these  ethical dilemmas, unavoidable conflict 
over proper interventions should be resolved through a 
decision-making process grounded in both medical reality 
and the principles of patient self-determination. thoughtful 
regulatory guidance can aid the understanding of rights and 
responsibilities when the desirability, efficacy, and medical 
indication of life-prolonging interventions are in dispute. 
the authors outline such a process. the authors suggest that 
seeking clear regulation in this arena is a worthwhile ethical 
and practical objective for physicians to reduce both the 
likelihood of conflicts and the burden of unavoidable con-
flicts despite transparency and communication. 
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indications became less clear, both to patients’ families and their 
physicians. Social, ethical, and legal problems consequently devel-
oped, and this paper discusses an appropriate framework for 
decision-making algorithms for resuscitation.
PErmIssIon to trEAt                                                 
In the English legal tradition offensive contact is considered battery 
unless the ostensible victim consents.(2) Even non-controversial 
interventions such as an appendectomy to remedy acute appendi-
citis have side-effects which offensiveness to the patient would 
invite legal treatment as battery, absent effective consent. A patient 
who is awake and able to consider a treatment’s risks and bene- 
fits – the case for most care-seeking patients – presents a straight-
forward opportunity to accomplish the ethically crucial task of 
obtaining effective consent. However, a patient able to give consent, 
Sp
rin
g 
20
10
Vo
lu
m
e 
7 
• 
N
um
be
r 4
273
who on learning about available options refuses proposed treat-
ments, has the privilege to avoid the proposed offensive contact.
Candidates for cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) with no pulse 
and who are not breathing cannot articulate consent. Reasonable 
people might disagree whether a certain patient would under the 
circumstances consent to resuscitation. Since broken ribs, aspiration 
of vomit and infectious illness are all foreseeable consequences of 
CPR, such contact seems ripe to be considered treatment as 
battery without consent. Since CPR candidates cannot express 
consent at the time treatment is offered, how does one deteremine 
if such treatment is ethically possible?
In emergencies - both for the incompetent and in other cir-
cumstances - legal fictions are indulged to support treatment 
without a patient’s express consent.(3) Parents may give “consent” 
for a patient legally deemed too young, and an unconscious patient 
may be presumed to give consent to emergency treatment. In 
resuscitation, ethical problems arise because no one can know 
what decision a patient would have made in the face of the medical 
developments that occurred after the moment the treating physi-
cians had last given instructions to his physicians.  Stakeholders can 
reasonably disagree on the patient’s decision. The more a patient’s 
condition suggests that intervention could lead to an acceptable 
recovery, the clearer the case for presumed consent. Where 
non-treatment is thought to inevitably lead to death the case for 
presumed consent appears strong. Indeed, some question how 
one might ethically avoid presuming consent for a potential CPR 
candidate.
Stakeholders’ miscommunication, misunderstanding and unavoid-
able differences in perspective can lead to disagreements in either 
direction:  Families may expect treatments that physicians doubt a 
patient would choose, while physicians may advocate interventions 
families believe would be contrary to a patient’s preferences. 
Physicians and patients can seek judicial intervention to require or 
forbid treatment over others stakeholders’ objections. Judicial 
determination is burdensome: Costly legal disputes pit families 
against treating professionals yet cannot determine the treatment 
that a patient  would have opted for. Confrontation - even in the 
supposedly civil context of a legal proceeding - provides poor 
outcomes even for prevailing parties. Better mechanisms are 
however warranted in the high-stakes, high-cost decision to resus-
citate where a patient unlikely to survive regardless of intervention 
should be resuscitated.
rEsuscItAtIon: Is EvEryonE At rIsk?                   
The increasing availability of resuscitation means people whose 
natural transition from life to death include a cardiac arrest could 
likely get resuscitated if medical intervention is on hand. The 
availability of tools such as ventilators increases the potential for 
non-therapeutic intervention via long-term intensive care for a 
patient without a plausible chance to recover his/her decision-
making capacity;  interact with family;  or  indicate the need of self-
determination or individuality by, for example, expressing a pre-
ference for solitude or for particular company. 
Resuscitation does not necessarily benefit everyone with cardiac 
arrest nor was it developed merely to change the moment of 
declared death  at the end of a patient’s life.  
A mechanism needs to exist to ensure that non-resuscitation is 
available as an ethical alternative to presumed consent.  Since death 
is the alternative many places have implemented institutional 
policies to resuscitate in the absence of contrary instruction - 
where resuscitation appears to be the standard of care -  to either 
avoid liability – or by assuming that most patients will benefit from 
resuscitation.
thE “do not rEsuscItAtE” (dnr) ordEr:           
not A comPlEtE solutIon
One solution could be  in the form of a patient’s advance notice in 
terms of treatment limits. A medical order, placed in the medical 
record and made known to all treating professionals, could then 
bar resuscitation under circumstances beyond the limit. Consent 
can also be obtained from a proxy legally authorised to make 
medical decisions for the patient. In some jurisdictions, statutes 
authorise physicians to consider a patient’s written medical direc-
tives - or a properly designated proxy’s consent - as equivalent to a 
conscious patient’s own decision. Proxies have practical strength: 
They can react to developments while the patient is unable to, and 
exercise discretion in circumstances which could never be con-
sidered by the patient.
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These advances in consent resulted from the ethical ideal of patient 
autonomy and self-determination. However, the focus on obtaining 
consent resulted from the dubious assumption that patients and 
their decision-makers would act rationally. When faced with situ-
ational stress, some loved ones aggrieved by a relative’s unex-
pectedly worsening condition entertain unreasonable expectations 
about continued intervention. Some patients may fear a medical 
practitioner’s knowledge of a DNR order and refuse to express 
consent to any treatment limits fearing that a DNR order would 
undermine the physicians’ zealousness prior to arrest. Some 
patients solve this concern by appointing a proxy, who can with-
hold from physicians the consent’s limits until the knowledge is 
no longer worrisome. Using proxies invites conflict between 
proxies and patients’ own statements limiting consent.(4,5) Despite 
the risks posed by proxies, proxies’ statements regarding patient 
preferences may be more accurate than those of treating physi-
cians, making proxies superior in realising the ethical ideal under-
pinning patient consent.(6)
boundEd rAtIonAlIty And unAvoIdAblE       
dIffErEncEs
What has not disappeared is recurring friction between stake-
holders over the appropriateness of life-extending interventions 
to medically complex patients. Adding to the conflict are: 
Imperfect communication on realistic medical probabilities; mis-
understanding of the patient’s objectives and preferences;  and the 
difficulty of an appointed proxy to make decisions while a loved 
one’s recovery prospects are deteriorating.
The optimal solution is not to absolve one side of responsibility, 
however simple the solution might be. Decision algorithms that 
would pit patients’ advocates against treatment teams does not 
improve communication between treating physicians and those 
seeking their advice.  Innovative provider to patient communication 
is needed to help align the understanding of all parties so we 
can  better realise our ideal of self-determination and informed 
consent.
Unfortunately, innovations such as improved access to patient 
advocates and counselling personnel compete for the very 
resources theoretically available to provide treatment. Different 
localities that prioritise resources differently can be expected to 
make different decisions regarding the advancement of different 
aspects of the entire treatment process, including not only access 
to interventions but also improved access to decision-making 
support.  However, resource limitations are a global universal.  Even 
if sufficient investment of training, personnel and other resources 
could eventually bring every patient’s decision-makers into agree-
ment with some treatment team willing to perform the desired 
interventions, this optimal solution would come at the expense 
of other priorities.(7) Decision-making theory and the limits of 
rationality in a world with constrained resources combine to 
ensure that stakeholder agreement regarding appropriate treat-
ment will remain imperfect.
The authors do not denigrate prioritising the ethical value of self-
determination by elevating patient autonomy through innovative 
communication. The authors rather suggests that - despite any 
community’s absolute measure of available resources - each will 
observe a non-zero incidence of failure to afford every patient a 
team of medical professionals whose treatment plans can be 
universally aligned with both the preferences of the patient’s 
informed decision-makers and the limitations of available treat-
ment resources.  Therefore, the authors urge planning – not ideal 
planning, but adequate planning – to manage potential conflicts in 
order to reduce the negative impact on patients, medical pro-
fessionals and communities.
The authors thus assume the inability to obtain effective consent 
to withhold treatment under the circumstances of some individual 
patients. Where consent to withhold treatment cannot be obtained 
or is revoked, a solution is needed. An ethical dilemma will occur 
especially when scarce or costly therapy resulting in resource 
shortages impact patients with a clearer opportunity to benefit 
from intervention: Does one abandon patients and the principle 
of their self-determination; or does one accept ethically unac- 
ceptable risks or wasted resources? Medical professionals and 
patients’ families need a reliable mechanism to resolve, with 
modest overhead, unavoidable disputes over the inappropriate- 
ness of treatment. Providers should not be compelled to provide 
indefinite maintenance for patients for whom medical opinion 
holds recovery implausible and families should be aware of their 
alternatives when the alignment of their goals and those of their 
treatment professionals cannot be reconciled.
EthicAl issuEs in rEsuscitAtion 
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dEcIsIons, uncErtAInty And mEdIcAl               
rEAlIty
Outcomes estimates are limited by the information available at the 
time and the certainty that conditions change. The likelihood of 
meaningful survival can change rapidly. When patients come to 
physicians and hospitals, they expect benefit. However, interven-
tions can fail. The patient with serious ischaemic heart disease 
advised to undergo revascularisation surgery, but who does not 
survive, might have had a longer life without intervention. The 
inability to predict negative outcomes often results in anger and a 
sense of betrayal towards those who proposed or conducted an 
intervention.
The Hippocratic Oath famously admonishes physicians first to do 
no harm, then to advocate the interest of each patient. Modern 
medical practice – complete with organ waiting lists; blood pro-
ducts shortages; costly experimental therapies with unknown 
outcomes or adverse events profiles; and established but com-
peting therapies with different outcomes and adverse events 
profiles – makes it difficult to ascertain what course would consti-
tute the avoidance of harm, and sometimes even whom one might 
harm. Ascertaining a patient’s preference regarding resuscitation 
can be challenging, considering the medical conditions and likely 
outcomes, particularly when the patient’s condition is unlike any 
the patient ever imagined. Assuming the patient desired “every-
thing” be done to stave off death, even for an hour of unconscious-
ness, that course of action could easily interfere with meaningful 
treatments of other patients to whom an equal duty is owed, and 
whose prognosis may justify prioritised resource allocation.
The micro-ethical world in which a physician can properly look only 
to a single patient in deciding the ethical course of action is a 
world that does not exist today and may never have. The world 
in which physicians treat patients routinely requires competing 
interests to be weighed in connection with scarce therapeutic 
agents and limited institutional resources. In the real world, all 
stakeholders face hard choices regarding the risks they will accept 
and the care that can be ethically offered. This world simply does 
not allow physicians to absolve themselves of ethical hardship by 
making available every possible resource for every patient until 
resuscitation has clearly failed. If we tried, our institutions and 
our society could not afford it.
Someone must allocate resources, including physicians’ limited 
time, in accordance with some standard akin to a mass-casualty 
triage environment. Incautious dispensation of scarce resources 
betrays more than the patients who might be restored to health: 
It betrays the community whose resources are expended to obtain 
scant result due to wasteful resource allocation decisions. Impas-
sioned pleas for treatment may be easier to accept, but someone 
must advocate for those who are absent: Those needing treat- 
ment after an overrun personnel budget prevented sufficient 
treatment personnel; those whose outcomes turn on the availa-
bility of one more unit of blood; and those whose taxes and 
insurance premiums are resources in the hands of a fiduciary 
expected to improve health outcomes. Patients likely capable of 
benefit should be hastened toward likely-effective interventions, 
yet some patients can be effectively aided only to mitigate dis-
comfort. Misallocating resources by oversupply is as unethical 
when it offers no aid to the recipient because the treatment is 
futile, as it is unethical when a patient has expressly refused the 
treatment and its provision is an assault.
Even in this world of uncertain outcomes, an optimal course of 
treatment may be ascertainable for a patient. Yet, the mass-casualty 
environment of modern medical institutions makes it possible that 
dedicating resources to provide optimal treatment for some may 
jeopardise an institution’s outcomes for other patients.(8) The 
capacity to benefit is a significant factor in evaluating the ethics of 
allocating resources among existing and potential patients.(9)  Futility 
represents one extreme range of capacity to benefit and provides 
a useful place to consider resolution of resource allocation conflict.
While we must strive to offer the best possible care to every 
patient, our recommended interventions must remain flexible, and 
vary not only with patients’ predicted outcomes but with the 
available resources at the time and place of treatment. The cer-
tainty with which physicians recommend an intervention must 
relate to the likelihood of the outcome. Because outcomes are 
uncertain, recommendations should overwhelmingly be made with 
the understanding that risks are ultimately borne by the patient.
It is imperative that full information on  recommended alterna- 
tives be provided. There is a cost in time and training to enabling 
patients’ informed consent, but failure to meet this standard 
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departs from society’s expectations, thus necessitating this outlay. 
Failure to keep decision-makers adequately informed undermines 
the principle of patient self-determination and individual autonomy. 
Purported consent obtained by limiting the options and risks dis-
closed to decision-makers is not informed consent, and is merely 
illusory. 
mEdIcAl uncErtAInty And thE dEcIsIon              
contrIbutIon chArt
Medical probability lies within trained professionals’ expertise, 
but weighing risks and the value of outcomes is the realm in 
which informed consent was intended to govern. Where options 
are few and likely outcomes are reasonably certain, independent 
medical judgement might invariably lead to the same proposed 
intervention. In situations like these, especially when time is of the 
essence, the treatment decisions are, within reason, primarily made 
by the treating physicians. For example: Relatives bring an other-
wise healthy youth with profusely bleeding penetrating trauma to 
the throat to an emergency department. An independent panel of 
hypothetical experts is required to  unanimously agree that surgical 
repair is the only option. What is more, panic-stricken relatives 
need to give consent prior to treatment: Given the time span, 
this  exercise could, in all likelihood, result in death.
Figure 1 depicts a triangular graph in which a hypothetical inde-
pendent expert panel’s fraction of assent to a proposed course 
of treatment appears on the horizontal axis labelled the “Index 
of appropriateness”.(10) As the expert panel result approaches 100% 
in terms of agreement, the height of the graph approaches zero. To 
the left zero height indicates zero patient contribution 
to decision-making. If treatment is desired at all, there is but one 
result. To the right, a zero triangle height indicates a treatment- 
team contribution to the decision of 100%. When there is no 
medical uncertainty on the appropriate treatment, the decision 
results in the patient being treated. In an informed-consent driven 
treatment environment, patients and their consent-giving repre-
sentatives should be kept as informed as possible even when their 
input is less crucial, so that once required they can make the most 
informed decision. The parties involved should be emotionally 
prepared to consider the patient’s developing medical condition 
when a choice arises. There could also be  times when the treat-
ment team need to keep the patient’s decision-maker informed, 
but with little reason to solicit input other than perhaps to with-
draw consent.
However, as treatment decisions are made in the face of un- 
knowns rather than  the basis of medically ascertainable certainties, 
patients and those expressing their consent should increasingly 
dominate decision-making. 
For example: A patient with prostate cancer opts for treatment 
due to the condition’s aggressiveness.  Moreover the co-morbidities 
of surgery and radiotherapy carry similar risks and benefits. In 
this case, a hypothetical panel of experts is unlikely to reach unani-
mous consensus, as the various merits of the different therapies 
plausibly appeal to different professionals who each have a 
respectable basis of opinion. If this hypothetical panel of medical 
experts is evenly split, with half favouring a given option, there is 
no medical preference in the selection of treatment; the decision 
lies solely with the patient.  Figure 1 indicates this: Where the 
expert panel’s agreement is exactly 50%, the vertical line drawn 
through the graph intersects the graph at its apex, and the 
consent-giver’s contribution to the decision is absolute and the 
EthicAl issuEs in rEsuscitAtion 
fIGurE 1: classic decision triangle demonstrating how treat-
ment decisions should be allocated between the patient or the 
patient’s decision maker and the treating professionals based on 
how independent experts might judge the superiority of an 
offered treatment. see text.
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Figure 2 presents a graph of contribution to medical decisions but 
depicts greater patient contribution with slighter departure from 
apparent medical certainty. Whether medical probability favours 
approaching patients as an advocate for a particular course of 
treatment or approaching them to dispense information from 
which to obtain a decision without preference by physicians, it is 
important to keep patients and their decision-makers informed so 
that they will be as prepared as possible to make appropriate 
decisions as conditions change.
non-rEGulAtIon of dIsPutEs ovEr mEdIcAl 
futIlIty dEtErmInAtIons EnAblEs 
conflIcts of IntErEst And InEffIcIEncy
Poorly-regulated disputes over the proper course of treatment 
lead to adverse consequences. Physicians can fear adverse con-
sequences from disputes over patients’ treatments: The incentive 
to placate family members in the event of a dispute can under- 
mine the legitimate concern to save scarce resources for patients 
not yet present and able to complain. Opposing desires of patients 
and proxies on one hand and physicians and hospital administra-
tors on the other create a problem beyond the ethics of resource 
allocation. Stakeholders should be working together with congruent 
interest to maximise useful and meaningful life, but opposing views 
on treatment can position patients and physicians as adversaries. 
Under such circumstances, patient care can be frustrating. Once 
the physician-patient relationship becomes adversarial, liability fears 
add significant conflict of interest. The possibility that litigation, 
employment prospects, relationships with medical institutions, pro-
fessional grievances, and other sequelae of patient dissatisfaction 
could impact a clinician’s career when  the stress of disagreements 
and conflict of interest arising when clinicians find themselves at 
odds with patients, exacerbates stress.
Exacerbating the difficulty of analysing disputes over resuscitation is 
the imprecise terminology framing the disputes. Futility is typically 
asserted as an absolute. In reality a treatment can only be termed 
futile once intervention was  given in full measure until the patient 
was so obviously beyond help that further resuscitation was agreed 
to be wasteful by all witnesses and that continued intervention 
was considered to have no desirable effect. To so demonstrate 
contribution of the medical team is zero. This does not mean the 
medical team did not provide information to the patient or the 
patient’s decision-makers, but that the physician’s role is informa-
tive and not persuasive.  If there is no basis on which to advocate 
any particular therapy, there is every reason to solicit the patient’s 
most informed decision in selecting treatment. Uninformed con-
sent is contrary to the patient self-determination, so the need to 
provide accurate information regarding the choices is very high 
despite the possible equivalence of the treatments.
How to value risks and uncertainties is not plainly established in 
the ethics literature. The correct and ethical result that should be 
reached at the extremes – deadlocked independent experts or 
absolute unanimity – seem clear in the light of  competing interests, 
but such circumstances may not characterise many disputed 
medical decisions. As one drifts from the clear poles of certainty, 
the weighing of competing outcomes’ value to particular patients 
may drive decision-making into the hands of patients in a non- 
linear fashion.  
fIGurE 2: the decision triangle makes the assumption that the 
decision-making process is linear; yet, as appropriateness of 
alternatives becomes subject to judgements regarding the value 
of outcomes and the significance of probabilities, the ethical prin-
ciple of patient self-determination requires great deference to be 
accorded the preferences of the patient. Accordingly, the sinus-
oidal pattern reflects an improved algorithm which reflecs the 
distribution of decisions among the stakeholders, more quickly 
accelerating to patient advocates the fractional contribution to 
medical decisions as a case’s prospects diverge from apparent 
medical certainty. see text.
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futility is undesirable. Futility analysis is also complicated by the rare 
cases in which recovery occurs despite physicians’ conviction of 
irreversibility. The limit of medical knowledge prevents knowing, 
with absolute certainty, that continued treatment of a live patient 
will be futile.(11)
The principle of personal sovereignty prevents a system in which 
patients, once delivered into the hands of medical professionals, 
must accept whatever care the physicians choose to provide. The 
fact that every patient is different, and that patients have legiti-
mately different interests and personal priorities, makes it impos-
sible to dictate in advance the proper care for every diagnosis. 
Yet, patients cannot be permitted to demand any treatment 
regardless of potential benefit or resource limitations. All stake-
holders need an established mechanism by which conflicts regarding 
appropriate care can be resolved without necessarily invoking a 
judicial system whose expense and adversarial nature work against 
the interests of all parties.
rEGulAtIon of dIsPutEd futIlIty                         
dEtErmInAtIons
Litigating the appropriate care to give patients following disputes is 
potentially costly both in funds and in time. A different mechanism 
is needed: One where medically inadvisable treatment may be 
withdrawn without liability for abandonment where it should be 
made sufficiently clear that there is little chance of misunder-
standing of the parties’ rights as the procedure is followed. The 
patient’s interest in finding desirable alternatives must be balanced 
against the need of providers and the community not to be drawn 
into indefinitely expending resources  without benefit.  If the rights 
of the parties are sufficiently clear, professionals and their institu-
tions can be protected from adverse consequences of exercising 
medical judgment even in the most antagonistic terminations of 
treatment.  The precise balance of these interests must necessarily 
depend on each jurisdiction’s differing people’s needs and expecta-
tions.  The rules should be sufficient to prevent disaster and tolerable 
to enough people that it can be accepted and implemented with-
out engendering a public sense of injustice.
Some jurisdictions authorise physicians to withhold life-sustaining 
treatment they deem futile once certain conditions are met to 
protect the interests of other stakeholders. Texas, for example, 
enacted a statute to create a limited period in which life-sustaining 
care must be continued following a hospital’s review of the treat-
ment team’s determination of futility. During that time, treatment 
advocates may seek a facility willing to provide the desired care. 
There is a cost to this delay, but the delay is not indefinite as the 
duty lasts but ten days. After the prescribed period - with notice 
and an opportunity to find alternate caregivers - treatment may be 
terminated without liability.
This particular balance may not fit every community, which may 
demand less or offer more. A different balance must be reached 
suitable to local sensitivities.  However, some  clear rule establishing 
the circumstances under which withdrawal of intervention will be 
protected is needed to prevent other ethical problems marring the 
treatment decisions of physicians, such as: Conflicts of interest 
arising from fear of reprisal through grievances or malpractice suits 
(which sufficiently clear regulation would reduce to empty threats); 
efforts to deceive decision-makers about the state of a patient’s 
health in order to manipulate their decisions;  or other potential 
ethical disasters.  Clear rules make ethical conduct safer and prevent 
confusion among stakeholders.
InvokInG futIlIty PolIcIEs                                    
Announcing reliance on a statute protecting withdrawal of treatment 
is not the ideal mechanism through which a treatment team informs 
a patient’s family that the end is near. The broader relationship of 
an institution to its stakeholders militates against reliance on futility 
policies when alternatives exist. 
Firstly, efforts to improve transparency in communication with 
patients and their decision-makers can be effective to prevent 
such conflict; and
Secondly, invoking a futility policy may itself do more harm than 
good: If a patient’s prognosis does not suggest more than the 
briefest survival regardless of intervention, there may be little 
■
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to be gained by antagonising a family with what will likely be 
perceived as abandonment.  
The particulars of local futility laws will offer guidance in this 
regard. Under Texan law, for example, a 3-day survival prog-
nosis should prevent invoking a futility policy because the 
institution would have ceased providing intervention with the 
expiration of the patient before the statute’s benefit ripened. 
Thoughtfulness and sensitivity must govern. Futility policies 
that call for cessation of interventions over the strenuous 
objections of family members are no reason not to work to 
avoid discord with families and they leave room to accommo-
date families when the gain to the institution and its other 
stakeholders is too minimal to justify the conflict and cost 
associated with the futility policy. As with other medical tools, 
judgement is paramount.
conclusIon                                                                  
Medical professionals have an important role in leading patients 
and their decision-makers to appropriate treatment decisions. 
Physicians have a proper role as an advocate for interventions 
offering clear benefits, but should offer disinterested but informa-
tive counsel when no particular treatment is clearly superior. 
Patients know that modern medicine offers outcomes that were 
difficult to imagine a century ago, yet disagreements over plausible 
outcomes and the appropriateness of interventions will continue.
Despite improved methods to keep patients and their proxies 
adequately informed to enable them to make decisions, some 
disagreement over emotionally-charged decisions surrounding the 
appropriateness of resuscitation remains unavoidable. Regulation 
to define parties’ rights in the event of disagreement on appro-
priate care helps providers to provide  unbiased, honest, and ethical 
medical judgment. Definite responsibilities in the event of disputes 
can be defined without dictating medical practice or undermining 
advances in end-of-life treatment. By enhancing the security of pro-
fessionals in discharging their ethical duty by offering their honest 
appraisals and seeking to keep patients fully informed, regulation 
can aid patients and physicians without restraining either patients or 
physicians in the range of treatment.
Regulation should avoid micro-managing the physician-patient 
relationship, and encourage patients to access like-minded pro-
fessionals instead of seeking indefinitely to maintain an unhappy and 
confrontational status quo through fear or litigation. Because clari-
fication of rights offers both a mechanism to manage the parties’ 
expectations and a shield for ethical conduct, it is the authors’ 
view that physicians should advocate specific regulations to balance 
the interests of the stakeholders in the face of disputes over 
resuscitation. Where treatment teams’ efforts to keep patients’ 
decision-makers informed fail to maintain their support for a 
course of action consistent with sound medical judgement, 
reasonable regulation should enable providers to restrict care to 
be consistent with systems such as the decision curves pre- 
sented here.
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